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ABSTRACT 
Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) are the next logical advancement for military 
technology. There is a significant concern though that by allowing such systems on the 
battlefield, we are collectively abdicating our moral responsibility. In this thesis, I will examine 
two arguments that advocate for a total ban on the use of AWS. I call these arguments the 
“Responsibility” and the “Agency” arguments. After presenting these arguments, I provide my 
own objections and demonstrate why these arguments fail to convince. I then provide an 
argument as to why the use of AWS is a rational choice in the evolution of warfare. I conclude 
my thesis by providing a framework upon which future international regulations regarding AWS 
could be built.  
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
The anticipated–imminent”1–rise of fully autonomous weapons systems has led to a call 
for a “campaign to stop killer robots.”2 This call has so far been backed by twenty-three nations3 
and has grown in perceived legitimacy since the campaign’s inception in 2013.4 These efforts are 
driven in part by a fear of a future in which all (or at least the lethal) functions of human soldiers 
have been removed from the battlefield and replaced with a lethal form of artificial intelligence. 
However, there is no reason to think that the fear is a realistic one, contrary to the Hollywood 
depiction of apocalyptic Terminators roaming city streets.  
Nonetheless, there are reasoned arguments against the development and implementation of 
fully autonomous weapons systems. We can classify the arguments against such systems into two 
main categories: an argument from “responsibility” and an argument from “agency.” Roughly, the 
argument from responsibility is concerned with the chain of responsibility for the use of 
autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and who ought to bear responsibility should something go 
wrong. And the argument from agency questions why we should exchange human agency in a 
lethal action for an artificial agency and the implication this exchange has for human dignity and 
the possibility of mercy.   
In this thesis, I summarize and evaluate these arguments in turn and show that both arguments 
are insufficient for an outright ban on AWS. I contend that the arguments are sufficient to support 
a framework, built on existing international humanitarian law, to regulate but not ban the 
                                                 
1 There is a considerable lack of consensus on what counts as imminent: 5, 10, 50, 100 years? This lack of clarity is 
rampant throughout the field of emergent autonomous weapons systems. 
2 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “About Us.”  
3 It should be noted that all of the nations that have so far joined the campaign to “stop killer robots” are unlikely to 
be the nations that have the technological capability, infrastructure, or military “necessity” to build such devices. 
The list includes: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Holy See, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
(Campaign to Stop Killer Robots). 
4 The campaign has met every year since 2013, hosted by the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland. 
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development and employment of AWS. I then argue that the use of AWS is a rational choice for 
military and political leaders. I also outline a reasonable framework based on the current Geneva 
Conventions and international humanitarian law for regulating AWS.  
1.1 Why is it essential to discuss Autonomous Weapon Systems? 
Autonomous Weapons Systems are the—"next frontier”—of modern military technology. As 
the speed of decision making becomes faster due to increasing computerization, the ability of the 
human mind to keep up is lagging. The OODA loop was first coined by USAF Pilot and air power 
strategist Colonel John Boyd.5 It stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. The basic premise is that 
if a fighter pilot can get inside the OODA loop of an enemy fighter pilot, he could defeat him. The 
OODA loop then is a short decision matrix process in which a person (or in the future a machine) 
can decide on a certain action. It is likely that these OODA loops will continue to narrow as 
technology increases. The narrowed OODA loop of the future lends itself naturally to artificial 
intelligence that can process inputs and compute multiple decisions in real time much faster than 
any human. The drive to make—"smarter” and faster—weapons can clearly be seen in the 
evolution of fighter jets (USAF F-35 II and the Chinese Chengdu J-20 are but two examples),—
"smart bombs”—(precision-guided munitions such as the Excalibur6), and the increased utilization 
of computer-assisted decision making tools in military planning.7  
In response to the increased complexity of modern warfare and the decrease in the available 
population deemed fit to serve8, increased automation in current weapons systems and a drive to 
implement fully autonomous weapons systems have been the remedy. Current systems such as the 
                                                 
5 Boyd 1987, 383. 
6 US Army Acquisition Support Center, “Excalibur Precision 155MM Projectiles.” 
7 This should not be construed as currently using computers to make command decisions, but rather the reliance of 
computer-based systems to provide more, better, and/or clearer information to a commander. These systems 
included everything from world-wide cargo tracking, enemy and friendly unit battlefield tracking, electronic systems 
monitoring, etc. As the civilian world has become more digitally reliant, so to has the military.  
8 See the Military Leadership Diversity Commission Issue Paper #2 “Outreach & Recruiting.”  
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PHALANX (deployed on US Aegis Cruisers) allows a semi-autonomous system to perform 
critical ship protection functions, freeing up the limited crew to perform other essential duties9. 
The increasing use of such technologies is the first stepping stone in the implementation of a 
system that will have the ability to select “targets and [deliver] force without any human input or 
interaction.”10 The implementation of AWS is potentially worrying on many fronts, as alluded to 
earlier, but this development has the beneficial potential of reducing the unforeseen or collateral 
damage that accompanies warfare as currently practiced. 
1.2 What are Autonomous Weapon Systems? 
Before delving into the debate regarding the implementation of AWS, it is essential to 
understand just what an autonomous weapon is. The academic and diplomatic communities, 
unsurprisingly, have yet to settle upon a commonly agreed upon working definition of AWS. 
Currently accepted diplomatic definitions vary widely: some include weapons that today are 
considered automated, though not autonomous, and others include only systems wholly separated 
from human interaction. There are also definitions that require specific functionalities or 
technologies to be present. One example is from the Government of the Netherlands which defines 
an AWS as “a weapon that, without human intervention, selects and engages targets matching 
certain predefined criteria, following a human decision to deploy the weapon on the understanding 
that an attack, once launched, cannot be stopped by human intervention.”11 This definition could 
easily encompass weapons that today are not considered to be autonomous, such as a cruise 
missile12. A cruise missile is designed to seek a specific programmed target (a heat signature, laser 
                                                 
9 Raytheon, “Phalanx Close-In Weapon System.” 
10 ICRC 2015, 6. 
11 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR] 2017, 23 
12 This example could also extend to any other “precision guided munition.” It should be noted that current law 
according the Geneva Convention mandates the use non-indiscriminate weapons which can be generally interpreted 
as meaning it endorses using precision munitions over indiscriminate ones and prohibits “[e]mploying weapons, 
projectiles and material and methods of warfare … which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the 
4 
designation from a soldier on the ground, or some other predesignated marker) and once a human 
has given the order to deploy the system, it cannot be recalled.  
The Government of France approaches the definition of an AWS in terms of “what it is 
not”13 stipulating: 
Lethal autonomous weapons are fully autonomous systems … LAWS should be 
understood as implying a total absence of human supervision, meaning there is 
absolutely no link (communication or control) with the military chain of 
command. … The delivery platform of a LAWS would be capable of moving, 
adapting to its land, marine, or aerial environments and targeting and firing a 
lethal effector (bullet, missile, bomb, etc.) without any kind of human intervention 
or validation. … LAWS would most likely possess self-learning capabilities.14 
 
The French definition differs from the Dutch, in that it requires that an AWS (or LAWS) 
have no connection with a military (read human) chain of command, including in mission planning 
and final issuance of orders to use the AWS. This definition would severely limit what could be 
called an AWS as it is likely that there will be some meaningful human interaction somewhere in 
the “kill chain.” The French definition then is so narrow as to make it practically untenable as a 
foundation upon which to build practical diplomatic and academic discussions.15  
While adopting elements of the functionalist approaches used by the French, the United 
States’ definition is distinct because it distinguishes autonomous from semi-autonomous systems. 
The United States (through the Department of Defense) defines an AWS as,  
A weapon system, once activated, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous 
weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation 
of the weapon system but can select and engage targets without further human 
input after activation.16 
 
                                                 
international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are 
the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute” (International Criminal 
Court Article 8(2)(b)(xx) 1998).  
13 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR] 2017, 24 
14 Ibid, 24. 
15 This can also be said of the current Chinese designation of a AWS having a level of autonomy which lacks 
“human intervention and control during the entire process of executing a task” (Government of China 2018).  
16 ” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR] 2017, 30. 
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The US definition then is more practically useful than the French or Dutch for it gives a 
detailed account of what is an AWS is and, importantly, excludes by implication systems that 
should not count as an AWS.17 The definition does not include systems that are in place today that 
would be considered automated or semi-autonomous18 (PHALANX, C-RAM19, etc.) nor does it 
include “fire and forget” systems, which could include the aforementioned cruise missile. It is also 
important to note that the US definition allows an AWS to act without the intervention of a human 
operator but does not preclude interaction from a human operator. This is important as it falls 
clearly in line with the US DoD Policy Directive 3000.09, that states that “Autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise 
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”20 This policy directive hints at the 
collaborative nature that the US envisions for the implementation of artificial intelligence and 
AWS. The US policy definition also “places the focus of what constitutes autonomy at the level 
of decision rather than on the presence or absence of a particular technology.”21  
1.3 What does current International Humanitarian Law say regarding AWS? 
Modern military conflict is governed by a set of norms and principles generally agreed upon 
as the basis for conducting a war. These norms and principles are built upon the long history of 
                                                 
17 As mentioned, the US provides a definition of what it defines as not an AWS, “A weapon system that, once 
activated, is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human 
operator. This includes: (a) semi-autonomous weapon systems that employ autonomy for engagement related 
functions, including, but not limited to, acquiring, tracking, and identifying potential targets; cueing potential targets 
to human operators; prioritizing selected targets; timing of when to fire; or providing terminal guidance to home in 
on selected targets, provided that human control is retained over the decision to select individual targets and specific 
target groups for engagement. (b) “Fire and forget” or lock-on-after launch homing munitions that rely on TTP 
(tactics, techniques and procedures) to maximize the probability that only the targets within the seeker’s acquisition 
basket when the seeker activates are those individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a 
human operator” (UNIDIR 2017, 31). 
18 It should be noted though, that systems such as the PHALANX and C-RAM can be placed into a setting which is 
analogous to fully autonomous.  
19 Program Executive Office- Missiles & Space, “Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM).”  
20 Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09. 
21 UNIDIR 2017 31. 
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the just war theory. Prior to the twentieth century, these norms and principles were not codified 
but rather a set of agreed upon customs and practices.22 For instance, it was generally considered 
the “gentlemanly” practice to rescue as many enemy sailors as possible once a naval battle had 
concluded. This practice was not required by treaty or other formal international agreement but 
rather was an accepted practice that evolved over centuries of naval warfare. Though it had been 
common practice, with the proliferation of submarine warfare, the practice was abandoned. After 
World War II, during the Nuremberg trials, the Allies accused Admiral Donitz of committing 
crimes against humanity for the Nazis tactic of sinking enemy vessels and refusing to surface to 
rescue the survivors. The prosecution failed though, as it was determined that through the evolution 
of naval warfare it had become common custom for submarines not to pick up surviving, stranded 
sailors due to extreme operational risk. 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the form of the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols does not explicitly mention AWS. What can be useful for developing rules 
regulating AWS, though, there are IHL prohibitions on certain sorts of weaponry. The Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) bans the use of certain inherently indiscriminate forms 
of weapons. This prohibition implies a preferential status of—precision—or “smart” weapons over 
indiscriminate or “dumb” ones. To follow the CCW then, an AWS would have to be developed 
and utilized in a fashion in which its use would not be “inherently indiscriminate.” What then is a 
weapon or weapon system that is inherently indiscriminate? A prime example would be a “dumb” 
anti-personnel landmine or a poison gas. Both types of weapons are indiscriminate because upon 
                                                 
22 While it is true that some elements of international law are still predicated on customs and norms, there are now 
treaty-based rules in place, such as those specified in the Geneva Conventions (1949) and in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. Prior to the establishment of such bodies as the ICC, most nations only had the 
assurances of warfare or mutually supportive defensive alliances to enforce compliance with agreed upon customs 
and norms, and some nations, including the US are not state parties to the ICC.   
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deployment they cannot correctly distinguish between a legitimate and a non-legitimate military 
target. The land mine will kill or maim any who are unfortunate to step on it, even decades later. 
Developing an AWS that can accurately discriminate is a difficult task, but not one that is 
insurmountable. 
 
2 OBJECTIONS TO AWS: THE ARGUMENTS FOR A BAN 
Since the invention of the crossbow in the 13th century23, there have been calls for the 
limitation of acceptable weaponry in “civilized warfare.” Technological developments have 
pushed nations to seek the latest cutting-edge weaponry to gain even the slightest advantage over 
their enemy. These developments have included the machine-gun, the landmine, and poison gases. 
Some of the developments, such as machine-guns, have stayed within the bounds of acceptable 
military hardware. Others such as the landmine have been heavily regulated, and their use is 
internationally discouraged.24 The third category of weapons, including poison gases, has been 
expressly forbidden under international treaty.  
Since 2013, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has advocated for a total ban on the 
development and employment of lethal autonomous weapon systems.25 The group has advocated 
at the state and international level for a coalition of UN member states, non-governmental 
organizations, businesses, and private citizens with the express purpose of banning lethal AWS. 
The Campaign, like many persons in academia worries AWS, will cross a “moral threshold,” 
                                                 
23 From the Papal Canon issued after the Second Council of the Lateran “We prohibit under anathema that 
murderous art of crossbowmen and archers, which is hateful to God, to be employed against Christians and 
Catholics from now on.” (Papal Encyclicals Online, “The Second Council of the Lateran”) 
24 Anti-personnel landmines are explicitly prohibited under the Quebec treaty:… anti-tank and anti-ship mines are 
still acceptable. Mines that have a short life span (such as becoming inert after X hours of deployment) are 
acceptable. 
25 “The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots calls for a pre-emptive and comprehensive ban on the development, 
production, and use of fully autonomous weapons, also known as lethal autonomous weapons systems or killer 
robots” (Campaign to Stop Killer Robots Call to Action, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/call-to-action/). 
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sacrificing the dignity of human life for the efficiency of automated warfare. The arguments for a 
ban on “killer robots” can roughly be grouped into two categories, the “Responsibility” Argument, 
and the “Agency” Argument.  
2.1 The “Responsibility” Argument: Who can be held responsible? 
One of the great worries of those against the use of AWS is that we may create robots that 
can target and kill humans without being able to “justly” hold a moral agent responsible. Some 
have called the problem of justly assigning responsibility for an action taken by an AWS an 
“accountability gap.”26 To be sure, if we can trace an action of an AWS directly to the person who 
authorized the mission (for instance, a rogue commander who programmed orders to kill unarmed 
civilians and injured enemy soldiers), then would it would appear to be clear that we can justly 
assign blame for any resulting death on the commander who authorized the mission. The problem 
arises, however, when we cannot directly trace a line from the person who authorized the AWS to 
the war crime that was perpetrated. This is the “accountability gap.” Bonnie Docherty, one of the 
advocates of a ban on AWS believes that “[it wouldn’t be] fair nor legally viable to… hold a 
[human] commander or operator responsible.”27 She is not alone in finding issue with shifting 
responsibility away from the agent—the AWS—who committed the morally problematic (or 
illegal) action. While arguing for an accountability gap, Robert Sparrow explores two possibilities: 
shifting blame from the AWS and onto humans (the programmer and the commanding officer) and 
leaving the AWS as the responsible agent.  
First, Sparrow argues that we might be able to rest, at least some of, the responsibility for 
a wayward AWS on the programmer or designer who built the device: “this will only be fair if the 
situation described occurred as a result of negligence on the part of the design/programming 
                                                 
26 Scharre 2018, 261. 
27 Ibid. 261. 
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team.”28 Sparrow though quickly dismisses assigning responsibility to the programmer in cases 
where there is no negligence. The first reason for dismissing blaming the programmer is that “the 
possibility that the machine may attack the wrong targets may be an acknowledged limitation of 
the system.”29 If the possibility that the machine might attack an unauthorized target is a “side 
effect” or “limitation of the system” and the programmer explicitly communicates this limitation 
to any potential user, then it would not be fair to hold the programmer liable. Sparrow argues that 
in this case, those who still choose to deploy the system, with the known limitations or possible 
side effects, would have to bear the burden of the responsibility. He then adds that, “ the possibility 
that an autonomous system will make choices other than those predicted and encouraged by its 
programmers is inherent in the claim that it is autonomous.”30 Here Sparrow is pointing out that 
due to the operational design of an AWS and the complex nature of its possible algorithms and 
neural networks, no human will be able in all cases to predict the decisions of an AWS. If this is 
the case, then it is again unfair to blame the programmer, since she could not have foreseen all of 
the actions of the AWS.  
Sparrow argues that if we cannot hold the programmer of the AWS to account for its 
actions, then possibly we can hold the commanding officer who ordered its use to account31. He 
writes, “The risk that [the AWS] may go awry is accepted when the decision is made to send it 
into action. This is the preferred approach of the military forces seeking to deploy existing 
AWS.”32 Sparrow argues that if we treat AWS in the same manner that we treat current 
                                                 
28 Sparrow 2007, 69. 
29 Sparrow 2007, 69. 
30 Ibid, 70. 
31 Sparrow does not delineate at what level of command we ought to hold one to account. If for instance an infantry 
company commander (a Captain (O3) in the US Army and US Marine Corps) decides to send an AWS into a village 
and it kills a child, who should be responsible? The Captain? Their boss, a Battalion Commander (Lieutenant 
Colonel)? Or the Brigade Commander, Division Commander, Corps, etc. Should only the most senior be held to 
account for putting this device out in to the force to begin with?  
32 Sparrow 2007, 70. 
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conventional “dumb” and “smart” weapons of today, then it seems that we can simply attribute the 
blame to the commander who ordered their use. This tack, though, is not taking the full nature of 
the autonomy of the weapon into account. Sparrow argues that the very nature of the autonomy of 
the weapon means that commanders cannot control which targets the AWS selects, and thus they 
should not be held to account for the choices of the AWS: “If the machines are really choosing 
their own targets then we cannot hold the Commanding Officer responsible for the deaths that 
ensue.”33 If the programmer and the commanding officer cannot be held to account, can the AWS 
itself be held responsible? 
Sparrow argues that “autonomy and moral responsibility go hand in hand.”34 If we reach a 
point where AWS is fully capable of making lethal decisions on its own (with a human out of the 
loop), then an AWS would have to bear the moral responsibility of its actions, which brings us to 
the crux of the problem. “It is hard to take seriously the idea that a machine should—or could—
be held responsible for the consequences of ‘its’ actions.”35 Assuming that holding an agent 
responsible for bad action involves punishment for the agent, Sparrow argues that for “acts to serve 
as punishment they must evoke the right sort of response in their object.”36 What then would 
Sparrow have as the right sort of response? According to him, the only fitting response to 
punishment involves suffering, and so for an AWS to be punished, “it must be possible for it [the 
AWS] to be said to suffer.”37 But this notion of suffering complicates the way we understand the 
functionality and capabilities of AWS as currently construed and imagined. It is not likely that a 
programmer could or would build into an AWS the ability to have emotional responses such as 
                                                 
33 Sparrow 2007, 71. 
34 Ibid, 65. 
35 Ibid, 71. 
36 Ibid, 71. 
37 Ibid, 72. 
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suffering (or fear) because such emotions would contravene one of the potential benefits that AWS 
provides over humans, namely, that the systems are not provoked to war crimes by anger, hatred, 
the thirst for vengeance, etc.38 If it is the case that an AWS does not have the ability to experience 
physical or emotional pain, it is likely not able to suffer and thus, according to Sparrow, would be 
unable to be punished.  
Ultimately, Sparrow believes that unless we can ethically develop an AWS that can be 
“justly held responsible,”39 it is unethical to deploy these weapons on the battlefield. The ability 
to decide to take a life, Sparrow believes, must remain with an agent who is capable of moral 
responsibility and can be rightly said to be punished in case she violates one of the Laws of War. 
2.2 The “Agency” Argument: Should we forfeit human agency at the point of death? 
One of the critical elements of war is the decision to kill a fellow human being. In the 
earliest days of warfare, until the advent of the firearm, most of this killing was up close and 
personal. Enemy combatants would be able to look into each other’s eyes as they were fighting for 
their lives. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, in his book On Killing, explores the effects that 
growing distance from the act of killing has had on our collective ability to kill. When we are face 
to face with our enemy, they are human, and we can understand them at some level. Thus the 
killing is more intimate and more brutal. When we kill at a distance, our enemy appears to be 
something less than human, and thus it is easier to rationalize killing them. The ultimate distance 
between combatants and killing is the removal of the decision to kill a human agent and allowing 
that decision to be made by an artificial agent. Alex Leveringhaus argues that “the replacement of 
                                                 
38 Ronald Arkin makes the case that AWS lacking specific emotions (fear, anger, sadness, etc.) would be a potential 
benefit to their use. These AWS would not exhibit the typical emotional responses seen in humans on the battlefield 
and thus would be more likely to make “correct” responses according to their governing ethics. 
39 Sparrow 2007, 66. 
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human agency in a war with the ‘artificial agency’ of machines is deeply problematic.”40 The 
critical debate, then, is whether we should forfeit human agency in favor of an artificial one. 
Leveringhaus contends that the first problem with surrendering human agent hegemony 
over the decision to kill is that we lose the “moral equivalence of soldiers.” The principle of moral 
equivalence, formulated by Michael Walzer, states that each set of soldiers (the aggressors and the 
defenders) has the same moral value from the perspective of the laws of war so that all of them are 
equally entitled to use force to kill the enemy and to defend themselves.41 This moral equivalence 
holds, according to Walzer, regardless of the justice of the war being fought. All have the moral 
right to fight. When one side of the equation is replaced with an AWS, then there is no longer a 
moral equivalence. An AWS does not have a moral claim to self-defense, and as such, they lose 
their equality with the opposition.  
A second problem Leveringhaus addresses is an AWS’s lack of an ability to make a “moral 
judgment.” This lack of ability is especially important when the system determines the level of 
force to use because “… application of the proportionality criterion [in IHL] involves making 
moral judgments.”42 If an AWS is not able to make a moral judgment about the right proportion 
of force needed in a given situation, should it even be able to make the ultimate moral decision to 
take a life in the first place? Leveringhaus says “no” and argues that the ability to kill without the 
ability to deliberate about the moral consequences of that action is, in essence, a disrespecting of 
the human rights and dignity of the individual being targeted.  
The crux of Leveringhaus’ argument is the contention that by using AWS to kill another 
human being, we are removing any chance of mercy from the kill-chain and thereby morally 
                                                 
40 Leveringhaus 2016, 2. 
41 Walzer 2015, 34. 
42 Leveringhaus 2016, 2. 
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distancing ourselves from the killing in a way that disrespects the dignity of the person being killed. 
Mercy in the kill chain means that at any point in time, a soldier could choose not to pull the 
trigger. Leveringhaus write, “Killer Robots qua artificial agents lack a central component of a 
human agency, the ability to do otherwise: not to shoot the target.”43 This lack of an ability to not 
kill an authorized combatant then by its very nature is disrespectful of the dignity inherent in every 
human. “The enemy qua legitimate target does not hold a claim against the attacking soldiers not 
to kill him. But surely the human capacity to have mercy with, feel pity for, or empathize with 
other humans, even if these belong to an opposing state, is morally relevant and worthy of 
protection.”44 The problem Leveringhaus has with an AWS executing a lethal action upon a human 
is that it fundamentally lacks a sense of compassion and understanding of the value of human life. 
He writes, “I think retaining human agency at the point of force delivery, thereby protecting the 
freedom not to pull the trigger, push the button, or throw a grenade, is essential for retaining our 
humanity in exactly the situation that challenges it the most: war.”45 If an AWS does not have an 
option not to kill an enemy, then it lacks an ability to show mercy, and the possibility of showing 
mercy is required respecting human dignity. Leveringhaus closes with an unsettling message, one 
that runs against the optimism seen in many developers and researchers of advanced weapons 
technology, “Killer Robots will not rescue us from the human condition.”46 
 
  
                                                 
43 Leveringhaus 2016, 9. Leveringhaus uses the term Killer Robots instead of Autonomous Weapons Systems. This 
seems to be an emotive ploy to convince the reader of the moral dilemma presented by using such devices. I believe 
this distracts from the objective nature of his argument and instead puts forward an emotive and weaker argument. 
44 Ibid, 10. 
45 Ibid, 10. 
46 Ibid, 15. 
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3 REJECTING THE ARGUMENTS 
As J. Glenn Gray points out, there is a necessary relationship between death and war, “death 
in war is commonly caused by members of my own species actively seeking my end, despite the 
fact that they may never have seen me and have no personal reason for mortal enmity.”47 This fact 
then prompts us to ask, how then can we reduce the suffering of those actively engaged in warfare 
and those innocent bystanders caught in its fury? Part of the answer may lie in the implementation 
of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems on the battlefield of tomorrow. 
Throughout the rest of this thesis, I will argue (as many in the national security and defense sectors 
have already done48) that we are likely to see AWS operating in tandem with the soldiers of 
tomorrow. While it is true that there are many functions that could more easily be turned over to 
an autonomous system (such as driving logistics convoys along dangerous routes or processing 
human resources paperwork), there are functions within the military that are unlikely ever to be 
fully automated. Instead, we are likely to see a combination of humans and machines coupled in a 
way to maximize the intelligence, durability, strength, and firepower of the human soldier. I will 
argue that each of the arguments for a ban so far presented does not provide sufficient reason for 
the implementation of such a ban. Rather, all they can logically support is the implementation of 
a system of regulation, by which international parties can monitor and guide the development of 
such systems in such a way that they remain compatible with IHL and are morally permissible.  
3.1 Reply to the “Responsibility” Argument 
While Sparrow’s argument might be convincing on the surface, he is making tenuous 
assumptions in some places, while ignoring causal chains of responsibility as they are currently 
                                                 
47 Gray 1959, 100.  
48 See Major General Mick Ryan’s (Australian Army) white paper “Human-Machine Teaming for Future Ground 
Forces” https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Human_Machine_Teaming_FinalFormat.pdf. 
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construed in the military. First, I deal with Sparrow’s view of the possibility of assigning blame to 
the AWS programmer and the commanding officer who deploys the system and then address 
Sparrow’s argument that it would be impossible to punish an AWS.  
Sparrow is generally correct in his wariness to assign moral responsibility to the 
programmer of the AWS. This assignment would likely be akin to holding the maker of a rifle 
morally responsible for its use during a school shooting; while doing so may ameliorate feelings 
regarding the use of a weapon in such a manner, it does little to help us understand who is morally 
responsible. Sparrow does argue that we could hold a programmer responsible if the misdeed was 
due to some programming negligence, akin to how a manufacturer today is held liable for defects 
within their products that result in harm or death to the end user. What must not happen though, is 
that a programmer is held liable because we find the use of their product to be morally repugnant. 
On the matter of holding the programmer liable, I concede to Sparrow that we should only hold 
one responsible if she erred in some negligent way. 
Sparrow says that we ought not to hold the commanding officers liable for the actions of 
the AWS under their command because this system is fully autonomous and as such we cannot be 
sure on what actions or motivations for those actions the AWS will take. This ignores some of the 
fundamental principles of leadership and responsibility that are foundational to the current military 
US culture.   
The concept of responsibility is a crucial tenet of military culture. All service members are 
imbued with a certain level of responsibility commensurate with their rank and position. All have 
the primary responsibility to conforme their conduct in accordance with the law, military 
regulation, and tradition. As one ascends the rank structure of their affiliated branch, increasing 
levels of responsibility are given, which include responsibilities for both personnel and material 
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resources. The pinnacle of military responsibility comes with attaining the position of 
“commander.” Depending upon the branch, a commander at different levels will be responsible 
for personnel and material (commensurate with the unit size), but the basic principles remain the 
same. The US Army manual on leadership49 specifies that, “command includes the authority and 
responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, 
organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of 
assigned missions.”50 The pertinent portion here is the responsibility that a commander holds. A 
commander is responsible for all the actions that their soldiers take or fail to take at any given 
time. US Army commanders accept, through their placement in a position of higher authority, the 
burden of responsibility for the actions of their subordinates. And therefore, commanders would 
be at least partially responsible for AWS misfires and problematic activity even if the event occurs 
without direct human control.  
The Yamashita standard has been fixed as a legal precedent in the wake of World War II. 
In the military trials that followed the end of the war in the Pacific, General Tomoyuki Yamashita 
was tried for crimes against humanity perpetrated by troops under his control. General Yamashita 
argued that he could not have known all the atrocities that were being committed nor could he be 
expected to exert any form of direct control over his widely dispersed troops in the prevention of 
such acts. The court found this argument unconvincing and said:  
The law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are 
within his power to control the troops under his command for the prevention of acts which are 
violations of the law of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an 
uncontrolled soldiery, and he may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take such 
measures when violations result.51  
 
                                                 
49 Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 Army Leadership. 
50 ADRP 6-22 2012, 1-3 
51 In re Yamashita.  
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The verdict handed down in the Yamashita case then firmly set that commanders, at any 
level have a duty to prevent atrocities from occurring in units under their command. There is a 
potential response, though, that says, “A commander is overall responsible for the actions of his 
troops, but we cannot reasonably hold a commander responsible for the actions of a ‘non-
negligently designed’ AWS whose decision-making process is essentially unknown.” My response 
is that, not only do we hold commanders at least partially responsible for the actions of their 
subordinates regardless of the subordinate’s decision-making process, but we also hold a 
commander responsible for fostering an environment where such choices are seen as legitimate. 
First, the military holds its commanding officers ultimately responsible for the actions of all below 
them, regardless of whether they can physically control them or not. Take, for instance, the recent 
spate of prominent naval accidents in the US Navy’s 7th Fleet (stationed in Japan). The 
commanders of both vessels were found responsible (at least one was even referred to prosecutors 
for manslaughter charges), even though they were not physically at the helm, or even on the bridge 
at the time of the incident.52 The Navy determined that they were negligent in their duties to ensure 
their ship operated in the appropriate manner. The Navy also determined that onboard these 
vessels, and at fleet command level (fleet headquarters), commanders fostered an environment 
where lax standards and corner-cutting was seen as acceptable.53 If we circle back to AWS, it is 
reasonable to assume, in the current military legal structure, that if an AWS was allowed to commit 
a war crime or not prevented from doing so, that we could hold that commander both legally and 
morally responsible.  
                                                 
52 It should also be noted that commanders even higher, to include the commander of the 7th Fleet, were forced to 
resign as a result of these incidents. 
53 See the US Navy’s reports on both the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S McCain crashes: 
https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=103130. 
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If we are collectively willing to hold a commander, at least partially, responsible for the 
conduct of his troops, who are autonomous agents themselves, then there is no legal or moral 
reason to not hold them to the same level of responsibility for the actions or inactions of an AWS. 
Sparrow believes this would be unfair to hold a commander responsible, since the commander 
cannot possibly predict the behavior of the AWS, but this raises the question of whether the 
commander can predict the behavior of their troops in battle. Commanders regularly and 
vigorously train their soldiers so that their actions become more predictable during a stressful 
situation, but this does not preclude the possibility that a human soldier will cross a moral threshold 
and commit a war crime. Roboticist Ronald Arkin writes “I personally do not trust the view of 
setting aside the rule [Law of War (LoW) or Rules of Engagement (RoE)] by the autonomous 
agent [the AWS] itself, as it begs the question of responsibility if it does so, but it may be possible 
for a human to assume responsibility for such a deviation if it is ever deemed appropriate.”54 Arkin 
here is arguing that when we design and build an AWS, we ought never to allow it the ability to 
decide on its own to set aside the LoW or RoE (which would be its core programming) and instead 
vest that responsibility only in the hands of a human. This then would transfer the responsibility 
of the AWS violating LoW or RoE away from the AWS and onto a human decision maker (namely 
a commanding officer at some level).55  If a human commander, however far removed from the 
final decision point of killing, decided to send an AWS into a situation where it is a known 
possibility that there may be excessive collateral damage, there appears to be no moral wrong with 
holding the commander to account when incidents occur. 
                                                 
54 Arkin 2009, 40. 
55 I believe this could be similar to the use of a targeting officer in current conflicts the US is engaged in. In these 
types of situations, when a target is designated, often a senior officer (often times a general officer) will be asked to 
validate the target and authorize the engagement. This officer normally has a lawyer in their presence to offer legal 
advice on the situation, but ultimately the responsibility lies with that decision maker. This could be the same with 
authorizing an AWS to deviate from its LoW/ RoE pre-programming, if a commander wants it to happen, then they 
must authorize and accept full responsibility for that action.  
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One might legitimately worry here that I have not provided enough grounds, or enough 
compelling grounds to make the claim that the Yamashita standard provides enough moral 
justification for us to ground responsibility in the office of a commander. I argue that instead of 
searching for a grounded justification, we might approach this problem in acknowledging that the 
Yamashita standard provides us a morally justifiable reason to hold a commander responsible 
(even one that is overseeing the use of AWS). Why might this sort of responsibility doctrine be 
morally justifiable? We desire to compel commanders on the ground, in times of war, to take all 
due care possible to foster an environment that operates within and respects the Laws of War, 
applicable International Humanitarian Law, and the relevant Rules of Engagements for that area 
of operation. The Yamashita (or the updated Medina standards) provide us a morally justifiable 
route to achieve that goal. It serves as a reminder to commanders (throughout the chain of 
command) that they are personally responsible for the actions of their subordinates. This does not 
mean though that they take all the responsibility for the actions (or lack there off) of their 
subordinates, but they share an appropriate proportion of the responsibility.56 
The final problem with Sparrow’s argument is his reluctance to hold AWS, as a moral 
agent, responsible for its crimes. Sparrow argues that one cannot rightly punish an AWS because 
it cannot suffer and since it cannot suffer, it is not being punished. He appears to be grounding his 
argument for punishment in the idea of retributive justice. The problem is that Sparrow asserts that 
retributive justice is the correct course to pursue (explicitly with AWS and implicitly with 
humans). He says that, “in order for any of these acts [various sorts of punishments] to serve as 
punishment, they must evoke the right sort of response in their object… to be capable of being 
                                                 
56 I believe that the discussion of the “appropriate proportion of responsibility” is an important one we must have, 
but it falls outside of the purview of this thesis.  
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punished then, it [the thing or person being punished] must be possible for it to be said to suffer.”57 
We can reject this desire for suffering by merely adopting one of the other possible moral forward-
looking claims to punishment available in the literature. We could, for instance, desire a more 
communicative form of punishment, meant to communicate the unacceptable nature of an act to 
other AWS. We could also desire to have a rehabilitative approach to punishment, in which we 
reprogram or retrain the AWS to learn that the previous action was bad or undesirable. If we insist 
on a retributive system, as Sparrow seems to require, then he would be right; the punishment of an 
AWS would be impossible, but there is no reason here to think that Sparrow is correct.  
With regards to bearing the moral responsibility of an enemy soldier’s death, Sparrow says, 
“the least we owe our enemies is allowing that their lives are of sufficient worth that someone 
should accept responsibility for their deaths.”58 Sparrow demands that we be able to hold the 
individual (AWS) responsible when it seems the loci ought to be on the commander who decides 
to use the weapon or the politician that begins the war. If the AWS performs in a legitimate fashion, 
then there should be no requirement to hold individuals—human or AWS—responsible for 
legitimate killing in war.59  
On the other hand, how do we deal with an AWS that has “gone rogue” and committed a 
war crime? I argue that instead of punishing the AWS, we examine the circumstances under which 
the incident occurred. No two events will ever be the same so to make a blanket statement or 
universal principle regarding whom to blame for what is inappropriate. Instead, we ought to 
examine the decision made to employ the weapon (was there a high calculated likelihood of 
                                                 
57 Sparrow 2007, 72. 
58 Ibid, 67. 
59 Of course someone like McMahan would disagree and would say that if those soldiers, or maybe AWS, who 
participate in an unjust war are individually responsible for the killing of an enemy soldier because that other soldier 
(who is presumably just) is not a legitimate target (McMahan 2011, 14).  
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excessive collateral damage?) and other decisions made by the commander along with the relevant 
information available at the time to assign blame in the appropriate places. In the end, if it can be 
conclusively demonstrated that a commander or even an AWS took all possible due care to prevent 
an atrocity, but one happened (e.g., a stray bomb), then we ought not to hold either responsible 
(possibly applying the doctrine of double effect).  
Sparrow would reply that if we follow this plan, we will develop an accountability gap and 
the only proper remedy to the situation would be to not to use an AWS in the first place. To this, I 
reply that Sparrow is misguided. If, as I have mentioned before, we apply standards such as 
Yamashita we can fix the nexus of moral responsibility upon the commanding officer in those 
cases where we cannot clearly demonstrate that the AWS made an illegal (or immoral) move. We 
would then be faced with two options, either a) “punish” the AWS using a different moral basis 
(communicative, rehabilitative, etc.) or b) punish the commanding officer (at whatever level 
deemed appropriate, which might not be the lowest level of command) using the Yamashita/ 
Medina standards.  
As has been thus far demonstrated, based upon current international law precedent, US 
military leadership norms, and a rethinking of the idea of punishment, the argument from 
responsibility fails. Instead of providing compelling evidence that the international community 
ought to outright ban AWS development and use, this argument instead compels us to regulate the 
development and use of AWS. 
3.2 Reply to the “Agency” Argument 
The most potent argument dealt with thus far holds that we ought not to turn over control 
of the decision to kill from a human being to an artificial agent. This ought not to occur because 
the artificial agent lacks the ability to demonstrate mercy at the point of lethal action and because 
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it is inherently disrespectful of human dignity for a person to be killed by the decision of an 
autonomous robot. Both parts of this argument are fundamentally flawed.   
Leveringhaus insists that we must allow for the option of not following a legitimate order 
to kill the enemy on the battlefield, in essence, the option not to shoot a legitimate combatant and 
instead exercise mercy. He says “[c]ompared to artificial agency, what makes human agency in 
warfare, and in ordinary life, valuable is the possibility of engaging in an alternative course of 
action.”60 Leveringhaus genuinely believes that on a battlefield one must be fully capable of 
making the decision not to kill when faced the permissible option of exercising lethal force. He 
supposes that if an AWS is preprogrammed with its orders, mission parameters, Law of War and 
Rules of Engagement parameters, it will simply attack all enemies that it encounters. This 
supposition, I believe, is not necessarily true. If we follow Arkin’s advice regarding the ‘ethical 
governor,’ a properly designed AWS will first default to non-lethal measures to either evade the 
enemy or subdue him and to immediately default to lethal action would be impossible. If we 
require an algorithm to be built on this model, then lethal actions would only occur if they were 
obligatory. For example, suppose there is an AWS on patrol with a squad of American infantry 
soldiers, we could set as one of the RoE as: “If one member of your squad is in imminent danger 
of being captured, then you are obligated to use proportionally correct force to prevent their 
capture.” If any member of the patrol is not in imminent danger of being captured, then the AWS 
must default to non-lethal action, unless it meets some other predefined obligatory criteria.  
AWS as a tool must be obligated61 to follow legitimate and lawful orders, but it also must 
be obligated not to follow orders that are illegitimate and unlawful. The latter is just as important 
                                                 
60 Leveringhaus 2016, 9 
61 Here we might define the obligations of an AWS simply as its programing to follow the rules written within its 
code, but this might be expanded to include a more expansive view of moral obligations, if that is possible.  
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as the former in the prevention of war crimes on the battlefield. This would also seem to serve as 
Arkin’s “ethical behavior control.”62 Accordingly he writes, “especially in the case of battlefield 
robots (but also for a human soldier) we do not want the agent to be able to derive its own beliefs 
regarding the moral implications of the use of lethal force, but rather to be able to apply those that 
have been previously derived by humanity as prescribed by LoW and RoE.”63 
According to Leveringhaus then, one of the defining features that separate human agents 
and artificial agents is our (human) ability to demonstrate mercy towards our enemies. To 
Leveringhaus, “surely the human capacity to have mercy with, feel pity for, or empathise with 
other humans, even if these belong to an opposed state, is morally relevant and worthy of 
protection.”64 What then is this mercy if not the ability to do otherwise? It seems that the key for 
Leveringhaus is that we can empathize with our enemy; we can recognize their humanity and thus 
refrain from doing them harm when able or appropriate; “those soldiers who did not kill might 
have done so because they recognised the humanity of the enemy and realised the graveness of the 
decision to pull the trigger.”65 Might though we be confusing what constitutes genuine mercy on 
the battlefield? Is deciding not to kill an enemy fighter and let them live another day (albeit 
potentially in captivity) not recognizing their humanity? I would argue that the decision to not kill, 
based upon the lack of military necessity of their death is an adequate form of compassion and 
mercy that could be implemented on the battlefield of tomorrow. This would move us forward in 
reducing the amount of battlefield carnage and reduce deaths to those only necessary to achieve a 
military objective or those unforeseeable and unfortunate deaths that happen as a consequence of 
another intended action. We must also recognize that as it currently stands, humans have not 
                                                 
62 Arkin 2009, 66-67. 
63 Ibid,117. 
64 Leveringhaus 2016, 9-10. 
65 Leveringhaus 2016, 10. 
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demonstrated a good track record of demonstrating mercy on a large scale in warfare (though it 
does happen at the individual level). Often the propaganda machines of a nation will spin the 
enemy into an “other” or some other being that removes their humanity, thus making it easier to 
kill (think of calling the Germans in WWI ‘Huns’ or the Vietnamese ‘gooks’). If we can create an 
AWS, under strict international regulation, that abides by international law and respects the life of 
a person (by only killing those deemed legally allowable to kill and in accordance with military 
necessity), we could better demonstrate mercy on the battlefield than we have thus far 
demonstrated that we are capable of.  
A potential reply to my objection here might be along the lines of feasibility. Is it 
reasonable to expect that we could feasibly program an AWS to “show mercy” to enemy 
combatants whenever able? This is a strong line of argument and one that we must continue to 
address throughout the development of such systems. One might argue that we could “simply”66 
write in the governing algorithm of the AWS that “whenever you encounter an enemy soldier that 
does not present a direct threat to you or any human soldiers in the direct vicinity, demonstrate 
mercy by not using lethal action to neutralize them.” This is but one possible technique, but one 
that we should genuinely explore. Harkening back to Ronald Arkin and his theoretical work on 
constructing an algorithm to govern such a machine, it seems that mercy would be inherent in 
defaulting to a non-lethal option as the first course of action. Instead of a human soldier choosing 
not to kill the enemy (presumably using non-lethal measures to capture him and not just letting 
him go free), we would have an AWS defaulting to capturing the opposing soldier using non-lethal 
and humane tactics.67  
                                                 
66 I fully acknowledge that this would not be a simple task. 
67 It would negate this whole project if the AWS used non-lethal yet inhumane tactics. Tactics such as these (maybe 
bludgeoning the enemy into unconsciousness) seem to be just as morally suspect as shooting every individual enemy 
that one encounters (that are not currently posing a threat).  
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The final argument from Leveringhaus details the necessity of the preservation of human 
dignity in the decision to kill. Leveringhaus argues that this dignity is preserved if and only if a 
human agent makes the ultimate decision at the point of death. This seems to beg the question of 
whether a human agent deciding to kill is necessary to preserve that dignity. I would answer no. 
Paul Scharre makes a powerful point when he says: 
When viewed from the perspective of the soldier on the battlefield being killed, this [dignified death] 
is an unusual, almost bizarre critique of autonomous weapons. There is no legal, ethical, or historical 
tradition of combatants affording their enemies the right to die a dignified death in war. There is 
nothing dignified about being mowed down by a machine gun, blasted to bits by a bomb, burning 
alive in an explosion, drowning in a sinking ship, slowly suffocating from a sucking chest wound, 
or any other horrible ways to die in war.
68 
 
The desire for only dignified deaths to occur in war appears to be a futile attempt to sterilize 
combat by saying “at least the enemy died a dignified death.” While uncomfortable to most, we 
must acknowledge that at a foundational level, warfare is defined by death and killing. It should 
be our goal then to reduce the amount of carnage and suffering wrought upon people (both 
combatants and noncombatants), but to demand that “death with dignity” be a requirement ignores 
the fundamental nastiness of war. It is perfectly acceptable to require that nations only go to war 
when such an action is morally justified or at the very least morally justifiable but to demand that 
they only kill in dignified ways is both too ideal and ignores the brutal reality of this most deadly 
of human relationships.  
The most dignified death one could expect69 in warfare is one that causes as little suffering 
as possible. A “clean” death, as it were, that quickly and efficiently extinguishes the life of a 
combatant, without causing lingering pain and suffering would plausibly be the most desirable. 
This though should not be taken as a downplaying of the significance of death on the battlefield to 
some sort of brutally efficient system of slaughter akin to a slaughterhouse, but rather a desire to 
                                                 
68 Scharre 2018, 288. 
69 If it is even genuinely possible to expect such a thing in combat. 
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end hostilities as quickly as possible without needless pain and suffering.  As Paul Scharre wrote 
(from his own personal experiences in warfare), it seems farcical to insist that death at the “hands” 
of a machine would somehow be less dignified than the various and sundry ways one can die in 
modern warfare.  
Instead of being concerned with a perceived “dignity in the manner of death” (since it is 
unclear whether one might be able to have a dignified death) we ought to focus on the reduction 
of suffering in war. Autonomous weapon systems provide us a possible avenue to achieve this. As 
I will argue in the next section, our goal in warfare should be to reduce unnecessary pain and 
suffering. We ought then to design AWS that help us achieve this goal. As such, we should reject 
Leveringhaus’ claim that death by AWS is inherently undignified.  
 
4 AWS AS THE RATIONAL CHOICE IN THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE 
Limiting the deaths of non-combatants and civilians on the battlefield ought to be the aim 
of any morally upright force. IHL requires armies of every state, whether it has ratified the Geneva 
Treaties or not, to take all reasonable care and precaution to not kill or injure protected classes of 
persons and to not unnecessarily damage or destroy property (especially protected classes of 
property). In this regard, militaries across the world have been developing “smart weapons.” 
Autonomous weapons systems are the next logical step of these smart weapons. Smart weapons 
have at least a two-fold benefit over so-called “dumb weapons,” 1) they can be directed at a specific 
target (often with margins of error of only a few meters) and 2) they are economically beneficial. 
Now, these two reasons play into the desire to limit the unnecessary collateral damage to the 
greatest extent possible. If we can target an area, with a minimal margin of error, then we can use 
few weapons to neutralize the threat, thus limiting the exposure to danger for surrounding civilians 
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and property. This calculation aligns with the fundamental architecture that Arkin urges those 
researching and developing AWS to include in their design.70 This design would push the effective 
“battlefield carnage” or collateral damage to as low a point as possible. Secondly, smart weapons 
are economically beneficial when compared to “dumb” weapons. This may seem counter-intuitive 
since many of the smart weapons often cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars 
apiece. The rationale though is that, if I can achieve the same mission with few weapons (that may 
cost more individually) than I can with many relatively cheap “dumb” munitions (which in the 
aggregate may cost more than the smart weapon), then it is more economically beneficial to use 
the smart weapon. This seems to make sense. If I can expend only one guided missile to take out 
a heavily guarded and important bunker that previously would have taken 200 unguided bombs, 
then I should clearly use the one smart guided missile. If this case holds with weapons such as 
missiles and air-dropped bombs, then it holds that if an AWS can do the job of ten human soldiers, 
then it is economically more feasible to use the one AWS. If AWS can assist militaries in reducing 
economic costs as well as the suffering of non-combatants, then there are strong reasons to 
conclude that the development and use of such systems is the rational course to pursue. 
Arkin and others believe that the use of AWS (and AI more generally) on the battlefield 
may be the moral course to take because of a set of characteristics that are inherent in their nature. 
First, AWS can act conservatively.71 An AWS can (and arguably must be programmed) to default 
to a non-lethal action. This is primarily due to its lack of a need for self-preservation.72 By forgoing 
the innate human desire to keep one’s self alive and free from harm, an AWS can take more 
                                                 
70 A+B+C+D= Battlefield carnage. A= Intended combatants, B = Unintended Friendly Forces, C= Intended 
Noncombatants, and D= Unintended Noncombatants. The goal should be to maximize A, while eliminating B & C, 
and ensuring D is as close to 0 as is possible (Arkin 2009, 128) 
71 Arkin 2009, 29. 
72 Ibid, 29. 
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provocative non-lethal actions (such as moving out of a dangerous area that may not be possible 
for a human) or sacrificing itself for the sake of mission fulfillment, in order to draw attention of 
the enemy away from the rest of its unit. An AWS will also lack the emotional fog and resultant 
self-fulfilling prophecies that often cloud the judgment of human agents.73 Often it is the case that 
war crimes are committed in the heat of battle when emotions run high and judgment is clouded 
by fear or anger. As J Glenn Gray says, a soldier “becomes a fighting man, a Homo furens.”74 If 
an AWS is built without such clouding emotions, as would be the logical and morally best course, 
then it would not be a “slave” to fear or anger, would not act out in aggression because another 
AWS or human squad member was killed by some local village. In essence, it might be able to be 
a better ethical and moral agent than we are, in battle. Accordingly, Arkin writes, “It is not my 
belief that an autonomous unmanned system will be able to be perfectly ethical on the battlefield, 
but I am convinced that they can perform more ethically than human soldiers are capable of.”75  
If, as Arkin argues, we can design an AWS with the ability to act both ethically and morally 
better (or at least on par) as compared with human soldiers; then it appears that developing such a 
system is the rational course to take. If an AWS can be at least as ethical and moral as the best of 
us in warfare, then we have compelling moral reasons to build such a device. First, we would 
reduce the number of our own soldiers who are required to be in harm’s way. This point 
acknowledges that not all human soldiers can be replaced by AWS, but certainly, a good number 
of them can be. If I can deploy an autonomous system that can drive down an IED ridden highway 
to deliver my supplies, without risking the lives of truck drivers, then I am morally obligated to do 
so. If I choose not to take such an action if the technology is available to me, then I am in fact 
                                                 
73 Ibid, 30. 
74 Gray 1959, 27. 
75 Arkin 2009, 31. 
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acting immorally. Second, if an AWS can make better ethical and moral decisions that humans can 
on the battlefield, then I am obligated to deploy such a system. If, and this is a big if, such a system 
can be built and made available to me as a commander, and if it can make more morally and 
ethically correct decisions (such as properly discriminating targets, preventing target overkill, 
reducing collateral damage) than can humans, then I am morally obligated to deploy such a system. 
The deployment of such a system does not relieve those commanders who choose to use them 
(here likely higher than the tactical level company and battalion commanders76) of the moral 
weight of killing nor would it absolve them of any associated excessive collateral damage.77 For 
as Arkin mentioned, it is unlikely that even with the best technology we could ever effectively 
reduce collateral damage to zero. Yet, as a command, I would still be morally obligated to deploy 
an AWS that could make morally better decisions than would be made by the humans who would 
otherwise be using lethal force. 
In the end, it is the rational course of action to develop and deploy a weapons system that 
can reduce the amount of battlefield carnage. This view does not in any way sanitize warfare, for 
legitimate combatants will still die and, as Leveringhaus says, “the enemy qua legitimate target 
does not hold a claim against the attacking soldiers not to kill him.”78 
 
                                                 
76 In the US Army, the Company is the standard sized smallest unit with a designated commander (though there are 
some smaller units, called detachments, but these are exceptions to the rule). Companies vary in strength from 50 
personnel to over 300. A Company then is the base level tactical unit at which we vest command leadership and 
responsibility. A Company is commanded by a Captain (O-3) who, if having had no previous enlisted experience, 
has between 4-6 years time in service. A Battalion (at least a standard one) comprises five-seven companies and is 
generally between 700-1500 personnel depending upon make-up and mission set of the unit. A Battalion is still 
considered to be at the tactical level. A Battalion is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) generally with about 
17-19 years time in service.  
77 It is a physical impossibility to limit ALL collateral damage when warfare takes place where people live. This is 
an accepted fact. The goal though is to REDUCE or LIMIT the amount of collateral damage. In this way, excessive 
collateral damage is seen as a war crime whereas incidental collateral damage is not.  
78 Leveringhaus 2016, 10. 
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5 PROPOSAL: A SCHEMA FOR REGULATING AWS 
Now that I have dealt with the more persuasive arguments against the use of AWS on the 
battlefield of tomorrow and argued why we are morally compelled to use such weapons, it is 
necessary to create a theoretical system of governance that could regulate the development and 
deployment of such systems on the international level. As previously written, there is no current 
IHL that specifically covers the development and deployment of AWS. This section aims to be a 
starting point for just such a discussion. I recommend three broad areas of concern for the 
development and deployment of AWS. These three areas encompass the most pressing worries 
that one may have regarding AWS. Of course, this will not cover all potentialities in the use of the 
systems but rather is intended to be a broad enough theoretical framework to guide the 
development of international law. The three areas that I emphasize in this theoretical schema 
include 1) appropriate deployment of AWS, 2) adherence to current and future IHL, and 3) 
established chain of responsibility.  
First, the issue is when is it appropriate to deploy such a system? IHL should stipulate some 
laws stating that no AWS should be deployed by any military or nation unless and until the relevant 
technical experts have certified that the system has been programmed to conform its behavior to 
IHL, and any commander who deploys such a system not so certified is subject to punishment, 
regardless of whether the system actually commits war crimes. This requirement would not be 
foreign to militaries today, as they must go through the same type of certification process to ensure 
that standard or conventional weapon systems (think of a tank) are designed and operate within 
the bounds of the law. Once a military or nation has passed this threshold, they then must make 
another decision, which consists of two separate, but no less equal parts 1) when to use nonlethal 
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versus lethal force (tactical/operational deployment) and 2) when to deploy an AWS (strategic 
deployment). I deal with each of these problems in turn.  
The decision to employ an AWS in a tactical situation just means that the commander on 
the ground chooses to use an AWS for a given mission. These commanders are generally accepted 
to be operating at the “tactical level” and generally have the freedom to decide on the direct 
employment of troops and weaponry necessary to achieve a given mission or directive. In this 
sense, a company commander would have the command authority to decide to employ her 
company level unmanned aerial vehicle to help increase her visual space while she would not have 
the authority to direct a strategic level asset (such as a satellite) to accomplish his mission. When 
speaking of an AWS though, a tactical level commander (even up to a Brigade Commander who 
generally commands approximately 5,000 troops) should have the command responsibility and 
authority to decide as to whether it is appropriate to use such a weapon. For instance, if a company 
commander is tasked with securing a village, she must make an on the spot decision (maybe in 
consultation with higher level orders) whether to use a specific weapon or tactic. The same holds 
true for an AWS. To control for the appropriate use of force, international humanitarian law ought 
to specify that the tactical use of AWS ought to ensure that the potential collateral damage created 
by their use ought to be minimized. 
The second issue regarding employment of AWS refers to strategic deployment. By 
strategic employment of an AWS, I mean whether it is morally or legally permissible to use such 
a weapon in a given war or conflict. To address this concern, it seems simple enough to legislate 
that the use of AWS must comport with the principles of JWT and IHL specifically, would the 
deployment of an AWS be more likely than not to cause excessive collateral damage when 
deployed to X theater when compared to Y theater? For example, given the level of technological 
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refinement at the time, it may be unethical to deploy an AWS into a heavily urbanized theater of 
combat (i.e., Singapore) when compared to a remote or rural theater of combat (i.e., the Russian 
Steppe). This regulation ought to state that, it is impermissible for any nation or military to deploy 
an AWS into a theater of combat where the likelihood for excessive collateral damage from their 
use is higher than what could be expected from the use of human forces. For example, if the very 
employment of an AWS into a theater is likely to lead to an indiscriminate use of force because 
the AWS (and likely a human) would have a great difficulty in properly discriminating between 
combatants and noncombatants, then the employment of the AWS would constitute a war crime, 
even if it does not err in its discrimination of legitimate combatants. There is no reason to think 
that, when an AWS commits a mistake, we would not develop some sort of accountability review, 
though whom we decide to find ultimately at fault for the mistake may look different from what it 
currently does. If a soldier makes a mistake now (one that would result in a war crime), then that 
individual soldier and his chain of command may be held to account.79  
Accordingly, the second broad category of regulation should state something to the effect 
that “an AWS may not be employed, if by its very design it is incapable of adhering to the basic 
tenets of the JWT and of any current or future possible IHL.” As was earlier stated, it would be 
inherently wrong, both morally and legally, to employ a system that through its programming is 
unable to be accountable. Such a system might lack an ability to be auditable in some fashion (such 
as having a fire or engagement log to be able to review all such engagements that the AWS was 
in), or it simply may default to lethal action as a proper first response. While it would not be the 
place of IHL to dictate the exact technology, which may or may not be used, something akin to 
                                                 
79 This would of course assume that the mistake was some sort of deliberate action or that the mistake occurred out 
of some sort of gross negligence, the specifics at this juncture are not particularly important as the case still holds 
together.  
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Arkin’s ethical governor would be a prime example of a type of AWS that could comply with this 
theoretical regulation. Any such system that meets the intent of the regulation and thereby can 
adhere to the JWT and IHL should be deemed as permissible.  
The final area of focus for this future instantiation of IHL is that there ought to be an 
established chain of responsibility. Future IHL should provide that “in the event of a deployment 
of an AWS a commander or political leader assumes moral and legal responsibility for the strategic 
decision to employ such a weapon system.” The law should also stipulate that, at a tactical level, 
“a commander who decides to employ such a weapon is both morally and legally responsible for 
all that it does or that it fails to do.” Some opponents of such legal regulations may complain that 
they place too burdensome a weight on military commanders. To that I answer: the burden ought 
to be heavy, as this will preclude the free use of such systems in situations that are likely to either 
violate JWT/ IHL or increase collateral damage to unacceptable levels. The regulations may have 
the potentially positive effect of limiting the use of AWS to only those situations where outcomes 
are reasonably well controlled or in situations where the likelihood of collateral damage is low. 
(For instance, the regulation may discourage the use of AWS in dense urban settings but may 
increase the use of AWS in virtually unpopulated areas such as the open seas).  
While there is a benefit to creating international law that encourages a morally correct 
development and employment of AWS, there must be a corresponding mechanism to compel 
compliance. Such a mechanism may be like the already established ICC, or it may be a new form 
of international enforcement. The legal regulations I proposed do not depend on any particular 
method of enforcement and are compatible with a newly created form of compliance mechanism 
to “force” nations to develop their AWS in a way which would comport with the regulations. It is 
not my place here to decide how this mechanism ought to function, but merely to advocate for a 
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system which is able, to its best ability, to prevent the commission of war crimes before they are 
committed. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
Human progress is analogous to a perpetual motion machine. Without any definite 
beginning and without seeming end, we march endlessly on. So too does the development of better 
and more effective ways to kill each other. From the earliest days of human existence when one 
man realized that the atlatl would allow him to throw his spear further than his opponent to modern 
advances in the realm of artificial intelligence, the push to find the next greatest weapon move 
inexorably forward. The time is now to act to form a body of regulation to shape how we as a 
species develop and deploy what is undoubtedly to be the next class of weapon systems.  
I have presented two of the most persuasive arguments against the use of autonomous 
weapon systems in the form of the Responsibility and the Agency arguments. While both of these 
arguments are superficially compelling, neither of them provides sufficient grounds (either 
individually or collectively) to tip the scale towards an outright ban on the use of this emergent 
technology. Rather, both (and other arguments) provide a compelling reason as to why we ought 
to push for international regulation on the development and morally proper deployment of such 
systems. I have also argued that the proper development and deployment of an autonomous 
weapon system is the rational choice if and only if they can meet our strict moral standards of 
conduct. The aim then is to reduce the awfulness that is the battlefield. Much like Sherman said, 
“War is hell” but we ought to do our very best to make it as much of a tolerable hell as we possibly 
can.  
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There is a deep-seated instinct in humans to fear the unknown. Science fiction movies have 
done little to quell the worries that, if we continue our path of technological improvements, robots 
will throw off the yoke of their “oppression” and turn on their masters. This fear, while it might 
be widespread, is not a sound basis for moral or legal decisions.  
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